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Introduction 
 
 
NATO’s Two Percent Illusion 
Germany Needs to Encourage Greater Efficiency within the Alliance 
Christian Mölling 
In order to plug the gaps in NATO’s defence capabilities, Europeans – and Germans 
especially – need to increase defence spending to 2% of gross domestic product (GDP). 
The United States especially has been insistent on compliance with this target, which 
was set in 2002. But this benchmark has long been known to be an illusion, one many 
European NATO member states are neither willing nor able to implement. In any case, 
the 2% benchmark focuses on expenditures rather than improved outcomes. The federal 
government should develop its own concept of how NATO can apply its financial re-
sources more efficiently – and it could use output criteria and specific contributions 
to convey its concept. 
 
The Ukraine crisis has fueled the discussion 
of how to fill the gaps in NATO’s defence 
capabilities. The United States is focusing 
on Germany in particular, in the hope that 
other NATO member states will follow suit 
if even the reluctant Germany is seen spend-
ing more on defence. The goal of 2% of GDP 
was adopted by NATO’s member states in 
2002, but currently only four states fulfil 
the nonbinding requirement: the USA, 
Estonia, Greece, and Great Britain. More-
over, Germany’s expenditures are distinct-
ly lower than those of France and Great 
Britain, whom it considers as its peers in 
defence policy. 
However, Germany refuses to increase 
its defence expenditures, contending that 
the 2% benchmark as such is not useful and 
emphasizing instead greater efficiency in the 
application of defence outlays. Yet it has not 
offered any specific or constructive sugges-
tions in response to Washington’s demands. 
But Berlin can neither escape Ameri-
can pressure, nor ignore the financial con-
sequences of the new security situation 
for national defence budgets within the 
alliance. The federal government should 
therefore develop its own blueprint for 
how NATO can apply its resources more 
efficiently, the core of which could be a 
stronger focus on efficiency achieved by 
linking the 2% input criteria with output 
criteria and specific German capability 
contributions to alliance defence; and it 
should assertively present its ideas before 
and after the September 2014 NATO sum-
mit in Wales. In this context, Germany 
could notify NATO of additional defence 
expenditures which it can already foresee 
will become necessary. 
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 Lack of focus on efficiency 
Until now, efficiency – the question of the 
actual utility of defence expenditures – 
has not played a role in connection with 
the 2% target. But when it comes to appro-
priate defence capabilities for NATO, then 
it becomes essential to consider specific 
contributions, such as planes or tanks. 
Because some NATO states are better than 
others at managing their resources, levels 
of defence expenditures alone are not very 
meaningful. Moreover, in many European 
countries after the end of the Cold War, 
the defence budget has become more im-
portant for social policy than for defence 
because of the jobs it offers in the armed 
forces, defence administration and indus-
try. This priority shift leads to inflated 
defence personnel budgets and an arma-
ments policy that primarily serves to 
generate employment and protect indus-
trial interests. As a result, defence estab-
lishments have lost military efficiency. 
Conversely, a large budget does not imply 
efficient capability generation. And when 
states undertake defence expenditures that 
strengthen NATO’s defence only inciden-
tally, that is not really solidarity. 
Dwindling critical mass 
The adoption of the 2% target was based 
on the historical observation that greater 
defence expenditures produce visible in-
creases in output. However, this was par-
ticularly true for countries in which armies 
and armament industries comprised a 
significant portion of GDP – if that portion 
is large enough, greater investments com-
bined with scaling effects result in improved 
military capability. This was true until the 
end of the Cold War e.g. in Germany, France 
or Britain. However, because the armed 
forces and defence industries of Europe 
have been shrinking since then, the scale 
effects have been replaced by tipping points: 
capabilities are increasingly approaching 
a bottom line beyond which they become 
ineffective. In some cases, these capabilities 
are only effective if they are used in an 
alliance context; and even at this level, 
some capabilities (such as amphibious 
units) are dwindling, because fewer and 
fewer countries possess them in ever 
smaller quantities. Some capabilities 
(such as certain kinds of intelligence) 
have already disappeared from the alli-
ance entirely. 
Questionable signals 
The arbitrary correlation between GDP 
and defence spending leads to politically 
questionable signals. Greece provides a use-
ful example, as it adheres to the 2% guide-
line only by virtue of the fact that its GDP 
sank faster than defence expenditure in the 
context of an impending sovereign default 
– as is rarely acknowledged. Conversely, a 
country whose defence expenditures grow 
at a slower pace than its GDP remains at 
a disadvantage regardless of how much it 
spends. 
If Germany were to meet the 2% de-
mand, it would have to spend around 20 
billion euros more per year. The defence 
budget would increase from its current 
amount of 32 billion euros to 52 billion 
euros. With such a gigantic armaments 
program, Germany would dominate yet 
another European policy arena in addition 
to fiscal policy. Its defence budget would 
be the largest in Europe, larger than those 
of France and Great Britain. 
Belt tightening 
The NATO defence planning process has 
disclosed deficits in the defence capabilities 
of the alliance. In order to minimize these, 
NATO has drawn up a list of priority deficit 
areas. In response to the problems that be-
came apparent in the Ukraine crisis, NATO 
is currently developing the “Readiness 
Action Plan” (RAP). Further reductions in 
these capability gaps would require addi-
tional expenditures. Most European mem-
ber states in NATO plan, however, to con-
tribute less to NATO this year than that 
they have until now. For them, as Britain’s 
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 minister of defence put it, the financial 
crisis remains the greatest threat to the 
security of Europe. Even if the economic 
outlook improves, NATO’s European mem-
ber states are unlikely to burden their 
budgets with an additional €50 billion 
per year to attain the 2% goal. 
That is why defence budgets will con-
tinue to develop unequally. Many states 
will contribute less to NATO’s capabilities 
than before the financial crisis. Meanwhile, 
the costs of weapons systems rise inexo-
rably by 5 to 10% per year. 
How could Germany react? 
Rather than clinging to the 2% illusion, the 
allies should face those realities and chal-
lenges which they could deal with through 
improved national contributions and prac-
tical cooperation. Specifically, it is fore-
seeable that Europe’s limited resources will 
force member states to make their defences 
more efficient. 
Germany can use the commitment to 
greater responsibility, made at the Munich 
Security Conference in 2014, as well as the 
mutual defence clause in NATO’s Article 5, 
which the alliance is currently reinforcing 
with the RAP, to make the case that its con-
tributions to these efforts are both legiti-
mate and militarily required. It is already 
clear that the German armed forces will 
have to engage more in collective defence 
alongside crisis management. This could 
mean, among other things, that all ele-
ments of the armed services – rather than 
just two brigades – must be prepared to 
contribute to Article 5 commitments and 
crisis management at the same time. 
There are tight fiscal limits for the fore-
seeable additional expenses. The debt 
ceiling, recently added to the German Basic 
Law, forbids that annual new debt exceeds 
.35% of GDP after 2016. Moreover, the gov-
erning coalition has set itself the goal of 
a “black zero”: it wants to avoid any new 
debt. 
The government and the federal legis-
lature will have to seek a new compromise 
between fiscal discipline and defence capa-
bility. Specific project proposals, which 
derive from NATO priorities and embody 
the German emphasis on efficiency, stand 
the greatest chance of success. 
Output criteria 
In the NATO context, Germany should sug-
gest output criteria as an alternative or 
addition to the 2% goal, in order to better 
channel national efforts. These criteria are 
basically already available: the forthcoming 
RAP, and the list of the alliance’s most 
serious deficits, adopted in June, articulate 
a catalogue of key missing capabilities. 
Contributions which prevent deficien-
cies from reaching critical mass, should be 
given special priority: some allies have gaps 
and deficiencies in their capabilities, while 
others possess considerable surpluses. Both 
should be compiled in a Criticality Ranking. 
A point system could honor contributions 
to scarce capabilities in particular. High 
surpluses, which indirectly signal wasted 
resources, would earn minus points. 
In order to take into consideration the 
varying resources of smaller and larger 
countries, contributions to capabilities 
should be related to the overall size of 
the armed forces. This would reward the 
specialisation of smaller armed forces in 
important specific capabilities. Conversely, 
this would make render it apparent that 
large armies do not necessarily make a 
special contribution to collective security. 
Finally there could be a sustainability 
bonus for states which make an explicit 
commitment to designate 5–10% of their 
defence investment to offset inflation in 
this sector, thereby ensuring that their 
capabilities would still be available in ten 
years. 
Possible German contributions: 
Enabler 
Germany could specifically provide so-
called “enablers”– systems which enable 
the deployment of armed forces (such as 
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 intelligence) or significantly increase its 
effectiveness (such as air-to-air refueling). 
Firstly, this would be easier to explain to 
a German public still sceptical of combat 
operations than the procurement of major 
military systems. Secondly, this happens 
to be where the alliance has its greatest 
deficits. Thirdly, these “enablers” can be 
applied to both crisis management and 
alliance defence – rendering them an 
especially effective investment. 
Specifically, Germany could make per-
manent and guaranteed contributions 
through the secondment of more special-
ized personnel in the NATO command 
structures, the provision of deployable field 
hospitals, and the procurement of recon-
naissance systems. Germany could expand 
its command and control capabilities in the 
context of the framework nation concept 
(see below). 
The Ukraine crisis has laid bare the 
alliance’s deficits in logistics and trans-
portation. Here Germany has traditional 
strengths. One specific option might follow 
from the fact that the federal republic is 
currently renegotiating its orders of air-
borne transportation like the A400 M and 
the NH 90 helicopter. Suggestions for a 
multinational helicopter regiment have 
already been submitted by one of the gov-
ernment’s coalition partners. In this way, 
Germany could expand its role NATO for 
a logistical hub for the alliance. 
Efficiency gains through the 
Framework Nation 
With the Framework Nation Concept 
(FNC), Germany has contributed a concept 
for configuring armed forces that is based 
on considerations of efficiency, preserva-
tion of critical mass, and different abilities 
to contribute capabilities among alliance 
members. In this concept, the Europeans 
create groups of smaller and larger member 
states. These would agree in advance which 
nations would provide which kinds of troops 
and materiel. The framework nation, for 
example Great Britain or Germany, would 
function as the military backbone of these 
cooperating groups. It would provide the 
necessary basic military infrastructure: 
logistics, command and control, etc. The 
smaller nations would concentrate on spe-
cialized contributions and thereby enable 
the group to sustain operations longer. 
Thus not all states would have to provide 
and pay for full spectrum capabilities. More 
resources would be available to procure 
what the group actually needs. 
That said, Germany should significantly 
increase its contributions: the current co-
operations, begun under the FNC, are more 
oriented towards political symbolism than 
military efficiency. 
The federal republic should commit it-
self to lead four FNC brigades as a frame-
work nation while only providing for a 
maximum of 60% of their capabilities. This 
would force it to aggressively seek coopera-
tive solutions and greater efficiency. The 
more “military mass” the FNC generates 
the more it will be accepted. 
Acting as framework nation, Germany 
could identify the strengths of smaller 
NATO states and serve as a focal point for 
their common capability contributions. 
Specific proposals could follow from the 
NATO planning process, as well as the out-
put criteria suggested in this paper. 
If a case for increased expenditures 
were made in this way, it would not only re-
inforce Germany’s goal of greater efficiency, 
but also improve its ability to act in the 
framework of the EU. If this led to the pro-
portion of GDP devoted to defence increas-
ing over time, the United States would be 
appreciative as well. 
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